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Mechanized Experiment Planning 
in Automaton-Environment Systems 
IVAN KRAMOSIL 
The first part of this paper is devoted to a very intuitive and general discussion concerning 
the role of experiment planning in cognitive automaton-environment systems. Then we propose 
and ivestigate a method how to use the formulas, sampled at random during the statistical 
testing of the formula claiming the goal in question to be accessible, in order to propose an 
experiment verifying the formula under the condition it is statistically estimated to be valid. 
It is proved, under some more conditions, that the cost of the experiment proposed in this way 
is the smaller the better is, from the statistical point of view, the implemented statistical deduci-
bility testing procedure. 
1. THE ROLE OF EXPERIMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTING 
IN AUTOMATON-ENVIRONMENT SYSTEMS 
There is a close connection between this paper and the papers [7], [8]; in a way, 
this paper can be considered as their continuation. It is caused by the fact that the 
theoretical model and framework of our present considerations will be the same 
as in the two papers mentioned above. Again, in the focus of our attention will be 
an automaton situated in the Euclidean plain, moving from one integer co-ordinated 
point to another one, observing the properties of such points or deriving them from 
the data being at its disposal and, last but not least, fulfilling some tasks in this 
environment. Because of a rather large autonomy of its behaviour and its goal-tending 
activity such an automaton is, in fact, more close to what "robot" is called in scienti-
fic literature than to the mathematical and theoretic interpretation of this expression, 
however, not wanting to involve some philosophical or anthropomorfic associations, 
or, on the other hand, some technically oriented problems or questions, we shall 
continue in our using of the expression "automaton" as in [7] and [8]. 
In those two papers our main attention was concerned to the way in which the 
automaton constructs its formal representation of the environment in order to 
classify somehow the quality of this formal representation and, if possible, to improve 
it. During the considerations leading to the notions and results contained in [7], [8] 
we have emphasized some "absolute" demands imposed to a formal representation 
of the environment (i.e. consistency, logical independence, semantical completeness, 
etc., see [8]) and we have neglected, to a degree, the goal-oriented character of all 
the automation activity including the process of formal representation formation. 
This point of view has given a number of interesting results and pourred a new light 
into the procedures of formal representation making, however, in the case of a more 
detailed study the goal-tending aspect of the automaton activity must be taken into 
consideration. In fact, an internal formal representation of the environment is 
always a secondary matter in the sense that it plays always the role of a mean, even 
if the most important one, never the role of the final goal. Considering the classical 
case when the goal consists in transforming the objects in the environment into 
an a priori defined configuration the submissive role of the formal representation 
with respect to this goal is quite clear. Nevertheless, even in the case of an automaton 
the goal of whose activity is to describe an unknown environment (the surface of 
Moon, the sea depths etc.) the goal consists, in fact, in an action offering some 
external formal representation to the user or designer, hence, the internal formal 
representation plays, again, an intermediate role. 
At the level of "reasoning" and decision making the automaton activity is concen-
trated to the problem how to find or form a plan leading from the present situation 
to a goal situation, i.e. to a situation satisfying some a priori given goal conditions. 
In order to decide whether a goal is reachable from the present situation and, in the 
positive case, to find an appropriate plan some knowledge concerning the automaton 
abilities as well as some knowledge concerning the present state of the environment 
is necessary; in case the automaton is not the only active factor in the environment 
the knowledge concerning the environment must be up-dated from time to time. 
Not penetrating into details as far as the way in which a plan is obtained is con-
sidered we must admit, in general, the possibility of a failure of this effort, i.e. the 
automaton is not able to obtain an appropriate plan to reach the goal. There are, 
in principle, two causes of such a failure; first, no goal situation is accesible from the 
present (initial) one by the mean of the operators being at the automaton disposal, 
second, there is a way leading to a goal situation, however, the data being at the 
automaton disposal together with its abilities to handle with these data are not 
sufficient enough to find a desired plan. In general, in case of a failure the automaton 
is not able to decide which of the two possibilities has occured. And it is just the 
instance when the experiment planning and executing begin to play a role in our 
considerations. Experiment, in what follows, is considered to be nothing else than 
a rather autonomous sub-goal tending automaton activity the aim of which is to 
enrich the knowledge about the environment being at the automaton disposal to 
a degree high enough to find a plan for the given goal — or to find that this goal 
is not accessible. The "autonomy" of automaton behaviour during the experiment 
planning and performing consists in fact that now, for a while, the priorities are 
reversed, an appropriate change of the formal representation of the environment 
becomes the sub-goal and some appropriate "physical" actions and their choice are 
subjected to this sub-goal. As late as after having terminated the experimenting 
the priorities take again their "usual" order and the (main) goal of the automaton 
dominates again its further activity. 
There are two levels of automaton activity on which experimenting and planning 
of experiments plays a role. The first one is very close to the level being already 
technically accessible by the means of our days and is represented, e.g., by an auto-
maton exploring the surface of Moon or Mars. The main goal of such an automaton 
is to communicate to the designer or to an organizing centre on the Earth as many 
pieces of interesting information concerning the unknown environment as possible. 
An experiment, here, may consist in submitting a small stone, met at random 
by the automaton, to the influence of some chemical substances in order to deduce 
some data concerning the chemical properties of the stone. In such a case the connec-
tion between the internal formal representation and the goal is the most simple and 
determined a priori — the goal is to enrich this representation as possible and to 
communicate this representation to the Earth. 
The second level of automata experimenting is more sophisticated, however, the 
continually increasing complexity of problems which automata will have to solve as 
well as increasing and descriptively already not accessible complexity of the environ-
ment in which these problems will be solved require to investigate this case as soon as 
possible at least from the theoretical point of view. Here we mean automata "intelli-
gent" enough to choose, in the case of a failure of the direct plan searching, an appro-
priate experiment which, having been executed, gives new data sufficient in order 
to find, after all, the desired plan or to say that such a plan does not exist. In other 
words, such an automaton is able, during its activity, to control the instantaneous 
priority of the goal itself or of the formal representation in order to achieve, after all, 
the main goal, if it is principally possible. 
During all this paper we shall consider experiment planning and experiment 
executing as two principally different and one after another following automaton 
activities, i.e., first a plan is made or found, then the plan is executed. Such a view-
point agrees with that most often used in papers dealing with automated planning 
and plan executing, however, it is far from being the only possible. In [9] we can 
find some interesting ideas concerning the possibility of mixed sequences of auto-
maton actions, some actions being planning the next step, some being of executive 
character — and the result of actions influences immediately the next planning 
actions (there is a possibility of a feedback). Supposing the environment to be of 
non-deterministic (or random) character we must admit that some actions involving 
the environment can lead to unexpected consequences, hence, a feedback between 
the actual results of an action and the decision which action should be the next is 
necessary in order to ensure the final goal achieving. This idea leads immediately 
228 to another possibility how to understand experiment planning and executing in auto-
maton-environment systems. We could understand by "experiment" any action or 
sequence of actions (or a more rich structure of actions) leading with a positive 
probability to the desired goal. Executing these actions we are experimenting — 
either the goal is reached, in other words saying, the experiment has been successful, 
or the goal has not been reached and we have to plan what to do in future. This is, 
besides other possible examples, also the case of plans consisting in repeatedly 
executed actions under the condition we know that, after all, such a repeating must 
lead to the desired goal. Driving a nail home we do not know, a priori, how many 
strokes are necessary to do so, so we can consider any stroke to be an experiment 
which, with a probability, can lead to the goal and, until the goal is reached we 
repeat this "experiment executing" as we know, that, after all, this will give the 
desired result. This way of understanding the notion "experiment" in automaton-
environment systems is developed and investigated in more details in [2] and it is 
why we limit ourselves, here, to the usual way of reasoning when experiment planning 
proceeds experiment execution. 
Before closing this introductory part of our work we would like to mention the 
fact that there is a book ([l]) dealing with the problems of experiment planning and 
executing in connection with the automata theory. The difference between our 
approach and that of [ l ] consists in the fact that in [ l ] "automaton" is understood 
in its purely theoretical sense known from the automata theory and without any 
cognitive and autonomous aspects ascribed to automata investigated in this paper 
or in [7] or [8]. 
2. STATISTICAL DEDUCIBILITY TESTING AND EXPERIMENT 
PLANNING 
After these rather general conciderations concerning the role of automated experi-
ment planning and executing in automaton-environment systems let us return to the 
concrete example of such systems introduced and investigated in [7] and [8]. Hence, 
environment means, in what follows, the set I2 of all integer-coordinated points 
of the two-dimensional Euclidean space. These points may possess various properties 
in various situations and the environment is supposed to be of dynamical character 
in the sense that the properties possessed by a point in different situations may 
differ. Situations are identified with all the possible past-histories of the automaton-
environment system, i.e. situations are identified with finite sequences of automaton 
actions; the set of all situations is denoted by S. The properties of points in I2 are 
supposed to be enumerated (Godelization) in such a way that to any i e JV — 
= {1,2, . . . } a property corresponds. These assumptions give the possibility to 
introduce a ternary three-sorted predicate V such that V (a, i, s), a e I2, i e Jf, s e S 
is interpreted as "the point a possesses the i-th property in the situation s". 
The automaton is supposed to be able to execute the four following types of actions: 
moves into any point neighbour to the present position of the automaton, operations, 
consisting in changing some properties of points in I2, observations, i.e. the auto-
maton has some capabilities (limited, as a rule), to observe properties of points and 
finally, deductions, including actualizations (updating), enabling to deduce some 
new assertions concerning the space I2 from those already known. A more detailed 
description of the supposed automaton abilities can be found in [7] and is not 
repeated here as this informal description seems to be sufficient for the aims of this 
paper. 
Let if be the formalized language built over the atomic formulas of the type 
V (a, i, s) by the mean of usual prepositional connectives and quantifiers (which can 
bound any type of indeterminates). Let X = X(s), Y = Y(s') be two formulas from JSf 
such that there is just one indeterminate of the sort "situation" occurring freely 
in X (Y resp.), namely s (s', resp.). The pair (X., Y> of formulas is then called problem 
and this formal notion is connected with the following intuition: if the present 
situation s0 satisfies X (i.e. if X(s0) is true) the problem is to transform, using the 
operators being at the automation disposal, the environment in such a way that the 
new situation, s', say, satisfies Y The goal situation is, hence, defined as any situation 
in which an a priori given formula is valid. 
Inside the systems investigated in papers dealing with artificial intelligence and 
automated problem solving problems are solved in such a way that, first, observa-
tions and deductions are used to obtain a number of data describing, to a degree 
"sufficient enough", the environment, at the second stage these data are used in order 
to find a plan solving the given problem. In the most simple case plan is a simple 
sequence of operators the execution of which assures the reaching of a goal situation, 
some more developed investigations in this field consider branching structures 
of plans with some further information necessary to decide which branch will be 
actually followed. 
There is, within the framework of mathematical logic, a tool enabling to transform 
the problem of automated plan formation into a task of purely logical nature, namely 
the so called situation calculus ( [ l l ] , [12]). Considering the problem {X, Y> 
we ascribe to it the formula X (s0) -> (3s') (Y(s')) and we ask whether this formula is 
deducible in the formalized theory based on the language Sf the role of axioms 
of this theory being played by those of an appropriate logical calculus and by the 
particular data being at the automaton disposal and describing the environment. 
If Z(s0) -»• (3s') (Y(s')) is provable in the theory and a resolution-based theorem-prover 
gives a formalized proof of this formula then the term (terms, resp.) substituted 
for s', gives (give, resp.) immediately a linear (branching, resp.) plan solving the 
problem <X, Y>. 
As a rule, the papers dealing with applications of mathematical logic in artificial 
intelligence are limited to transformation some AI problems into that of deducibility 
of some formula or formulas and neglect the questions connected with deducibility 
deciding. However, it is a well-known fact that, with the exception of some simplest 
theories, the set of all theorems of a formalized theory is recursively enumerable 
but not recursive. Hence, the question whether X(s0) -> (3s') (Y(s')) is a theorem 
or not is not algorithmically decidable, in general, and the procedure of plan making 
offered by the situation calculus is not completely defined supposing it is not en-
riched by a deducibility decision making procedure. On the other hand, the undecida-
bility of formalized theories implies immediately that such a deducibility decision 
making procedure either is not recursive or it does not give the correct answer for 
all formulas of £C. 
This way of reasoning justifies the idea of using some statistically based deduci-
bility testing procedures. Submitting a formula to a statistical deducibility test we 
obtain the answer (concerning the question whether the tested formula is or is not 
a theorem) which is not always true, however, we request the probability of error 
to be "small enough". An appropriate statistical deducibility testing procedure is 
"better" than any deterministic decision procedure in the sense that the statistical 
procedure gives to any formula a positive probability to be decided correctly what 
no deterministic procedure is able to achieve effectively. Hence, the admitting of 
statistical deducibility tests as a tool used in automated theorem proving and automated 
plan formation seems to be a step naturally justified by real conditions in which 
automata are to act and which do not admit some non-recursive decision procedures 
of semi-algorithmical type. Moreover, in what follows we propose a way how to use 
an appropriate statistical deducibility testing procedure as a tool for automated 
experiment planning. 
It is not the aim of this paper to investigate how an appropriate statistical deduci-
bility testing procedure can be constructed, some information can be found in [10] 
or [5], some further references also in [6]. From the formally descriptive point 
of view which is sufficient for the sake of this paper we can say the following. 
Let <[Q, Sf, P} be a probability space (i.e. Q is a non-empty set, Sf is a cr-field 
of subsets of Q and P is a probabilistic measure, defined on ££), let X be a parameter 
space (multidimensional, in general). Let {t, f} be a two-elemented set the interpreta-
tion of whose elements are "provable" for t, "unprovable" for f, let Tbe a mapping 
of the Cartesian product ££ x X x Q into {t, f} such that for any a e S£, xeX, 
{co:coeQ, T(a, x, co) = i] e £f . 
Then the mapping Tis called statistical deducibility testing procedure and the 
random event {co : co e Q, T(a, x, co) = t} represents the result consisting in pro-
claiming the formula a e =£? to be a theorem under the condition that the parameter 
of the statistical testing procedure equals x (and dually for {co : co e Q, T(a, x, co) = f}). 
As explained above, the possibility that a is a theorem (a e ST c if, in symbols) 
and, at the same time, T(a, x, co) = f or vice versa cannot be excluded, in general, 
and the probabilities of these two possible errors serve as criteria measuring the 
qualities of such a testing procedure T. In order to be able to define the appropriate 
conditional probabilities (and to eliminate the dependence of our results on a parti- 231 
cular formula a) we suppose to have at our disposal a random variable a, sampling 
the formula which is to be tested, i.e. a maps Q into £C in such a way that for any 
{co : co e Q, a(co) = a} e Sf •. 
Now, supposing P({co :coeQ, a(co) e ST}) 4= 0, P({co :coeQ, a(co) e i f - ST}) 4 0, 
we can define, for any xeX, 
PEt(x) = P({co : T(a(co), x, co) = t}/{co : a(co) e ££ - ST}), 
PE2(x) = P({co : T(a(co), x, co) = f}/{t» : a(co) s ST}) . 
The value PEx(x) is called the first type probability of error and consists in wrong 
proclaiming a non-theorem to be a theorem, PE2(x) is called the second type prob-
ability of error and consists in wrong proclaiming a theorem to be a non-theorem. 
As a rule, there are reasons for a separate treating and studying the two probabilities 
and this point of view has some good justification also if statistical deducibility 
testing procedures are investigated. 
Let us limit ourselves to the statistical deducibility testing procedures based 
on at random sampled extensions, this idea occurred for the first time in [10], see 
also [5], [7]. Suppose to be given a sequence of mutually independent and equally 
distributed random variables au a2, ..., aN (N given a priori, as well as M = N) 
such that for any ae £P, a closed 
(1) P({co : «.(<») = a}) > 0 . 
Having at our disposal an effectively modified theorem-prover, e.g. a resolution-based 
theorem-prover together with some time and space restrictions we shall try, for any 
i =• N, whether a^co) -* a(co) is a theorem provable by the theorem-prover at our 
disposal or not. If there is at least one *' ^ N such that a^co) -> a(co) is not a theorem 
or if the number of cases in which it is a theorem is smaller than M, we proclaim 
a(co) to be a non-theorem. In the opposite case, i.e. if there are at least M formulas 
among ax(co), ..., aN(co) enabling to prove a(co) and no of the formulas a^co), ... 
..., aN(co) enables to disprove a(co), we proclaim a(co) to be a theorem. The parameter 
space X, clearly, has the form 
X = {<M,N> :N = 1,2, ...,M = 0 ,1 ,2 , ...,N}. 
Theorem 1. Let<M0,iVo>e^,let <£2,^,P> be a probability space on which random 
variables a, a., a2, . • -,aN are defined, mutually independent and, for a., a2, ..., aN, 
equally distributed, such that 
(2) 0 < P({co :coeQ, a(co) e 3T}) < 1 , 
(3) 0 < P({co :coeQ, ax(o>) = a'}) 
for any a' = V(a, i, s) e S£. Let T(a, <M0, JV„>, •) be the statistical deducibility 
testing procedure defined, using X, a, a1, a2, ..., aN as above. Then there exists, 
for any e > 0, a parameter value <M„ At,> such that 
P E ^ M , , At,» = PEt(T(a, <M„ At,>, •)) < e . 
Remark. Similar theorems are proved in [10], [5], [7] in the general case of statisti-
cal deducibility testing procedures, however, under a stronger condition, namely, 
P({co : at(co) = a'}) > 0 for any a' e S£. Theorem 1 shows that in the more specified 
conditions investigated in this condition can be weakened. In other words, Theorem 1 
shows the set of all formulas of the form V(a, i, s) (this set will be denoted by "f c Sf) 
to be "rich enough" to serve as a basis of a statistical deducibility testing procedure 
based on at random sampled extensions. 
Proof. (2) gives that 9~ # ££, hence, the formalized theory <"££, 3~) is consistent. 
Let a(co) e Sf — 2T, then a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a,(co) -» a(co) 
to be a theorem is that a;(co) e S? — ST. Taking into consideration the supposed 
statistical independence of the random variables a,, a2, ..., aNo and setting M0 = N0 
we have 
PE,(T(a, <JV0, JV0>, •)) < P({co :coeQ, a.(co) e Sf - ST, .. .,aNo(co) e Sf - ST}) = 
= (P({co : a^co) e S£ - ST}))N° -> 0 
for N0 -> oo, as P({co : ax(co) e Sf - 5
r}) < 1 (e.g., if j 0 is a tautological property, 
then V(a,j0, s)eST for any aeI
2,seS and P({co : a^co) = V(a,j0, s)}) > 0 accord-
ing to (3). 
So, if M, = At, > (log e) (log (P({co : co e Q, at(co) e ££ - ^"})))
_1, then 
P £ 1 « M „ iV,» < e. Q.E.D. 
In all the rest of this paper we suppose to have chosen and fixed a statistical de-
ducibility testing procedure T(a, <M,N), •) such that TE1(<M,At» < e and 
PE2(<[M, N)) is minimal or acceptable from some point of view. Abbreviately, this 
T(a, <M, At>, •) will be denoted by T,(a). 
Let us return in our considerations to the moment when we transformed a question 
how to solve the problem <[X, Y) into another question - to find a resolution based 
proof of the formula X(s0) -*• (3s') (Y(s')). Suppose our attempt to prove this formula 
to fail and apply the statistical deducibility testing procedure Te(a(X(s0) -» 
-* (3s') (Y(s'))), where a(a), a e ££, is the random variable taking only one value from Sf, 
namely a. Consider the case when T,(a(Z(s0) -> (3s') (Y(s')); co) = t, i.e. the tested 
formula is proclaimed to be a theorem, then we have m formulas, M, < m = Ne, 
say a;](co), ai2(co), . . . , aim(co), im % At,, sampled at random and such that we are 
able to prove a,/co) ~> \X(s0) -*• (3s') (Y(s'))] for any ;' = m. Hence, we are also 
able to prove 
[«..(«) v ««» v • • • v *Ja>J] -> [X(s0) - (3s') (Y(s'))] . 
It follows immediately, that if we were able to verify at least one among the formulas 
«f (co),/ — m, as being valid in the environment, we can enrich our formalized theory 
by the new axiom V aij(co) an<l then we shall be able to prove X(s0) -> (3s') (Y(s')) 
.7 = 1 
in the enriched theory using the resolution-based theorem-prover supposed to be 
at our disposal. Clearly, this proof can be then used in order to derive a plan solving 
the problem (X, Y>. In other words, the statistical deducibility testing procedure 
serves as a random generator of auxiliary hypotheses; the verification at least one 
of them is a sufficient condition for obtaining a plan which solves (X, Y>. 
Using Theorem 1 we may suppose and shall suppose in all the rest of this paper, 
that the random variables <xlt a2, ..., aN take their values in the set "T c- .£?, V = 
= {V(a, i, s) : a el2, ieJf,se S} under the condition that (3) holds. It means, 
that every <xt(co) is a formula V(a, i, s), a e I
2, i e J/", s e S, and we may associate 
with any statistical deducibility testing procedure T(a, <M, N}, •) and any a e JS? 
a set-valued random variable T*(a), defined on <[Q, £f, P> and taking its values 
in the set of all the most N-elemented subsets of ir, namely: 
T*(a) (co) = {V(altjlt slt co), V(a2,j2, s2, co),..., V(am,jm, sm, to)} c ir , 
for any k — m there is lk jg A
T such that alk(co) = V(ak,jk, sk, co) and Uik(co) -* a 
has been proved to be a theorem and for no av(co) not belonging to T*(a) (co) the 
implication av(co) -* a has been proved to be a theorem. This formal definition 
of T*(a) (co) seems to be very complicated, however, the intuitive sense is quite simple: 
T*(a) (co) is the set of all formulas sampled at random during the process of statistical 
deducibility testing of a which "helped" us to prove a. From this also the following 
assertion immediately follows: 
Theorem 2. For any a e Jzf, if T(a(a), <M, N}, co) = t, then T*(a) (co) contains 
at least M elements (supposing that possible multiple samples of the same formula 
are counted separately). 
3. AUTOMATON EXPERIMENTING POSSIBILITIES AND 
THEIR CLASSIFICATION 
We have to consider, now, our abilities (or automaton abilities) when a formula 
V(a, i,s)eir is to be verified. These abilities are determined by the technical and 
program equipment of the automaton and by the real physical state of the environ-
ment and they cannot be, in such a case, an object of a direct mathematical investiga-
tion. The situation is similar to that of automaton operators and conditions asso-
ciated with them; such model is investigated in [ l l ] and other papers dealing with 
robotics and artificial intelligence. We have accepted this point of view also in [7], 
[8] and among the four types of automaton actions (moves, observations, deductions 
and operations) operations were the only connected with some conditions of appli-
cability the other actions being supposed to be applicable in any case. In order to 
develop further our model of automated experiment planning we shall suppose, 
in what follows, that also observations are connected with some conditions and vali-
dity at least one of these conditions is necessary and sufficient for the observation 
to be successful (i.e. giving a definite answer). 
The observational conditions are described, formally, by a subset EXP <=. I2 x 
x Jr x I2 x J/ x S it means, EXP contains quintuples of the form (b,j, a, i, s>, 
a, be I2, i,j e JT, se S. The intuitive sense is as follows: let (b, j , a, i, s) e EXP, 
then, in order to be able to decide, by an observation, whether V(a, i, s) holds or does 
not hold we must change the situation of the environment into such a new situation 
s' that V(b, j , s') holds. In other words, to be able to observe V(a, i, s) or its negation 
the point be I2 must possess the j'-th property. Of course, the possibility that there 
are different b's and / s such that <£>,;', a, i, s> e EXP is not excluded. For a fixed 
V(a, i, s) we denote 
EXPv(a, i, s) = {<£>, j> : (b,j, a, i, s> e EXP} 
and any (b,j") e EXPv(a, i, s) can be called an experiment for deciding V(a, i, s). 
In case the set EXPy(a, i, s) contains more than one pair we have a possibility 
to choose among them when desiring to verify V(a, i, s). As the most natural criterion 
according to which the pairs from EXPv(a, i, s) can be classified and ordered we take 
the minimal expenses connected with the realization of a situation enabling to verify 
V(a, i, s). The notion of expenses is supposed to be general enough to cover not 
only the demands of financial kind but also those of processing time, computer 
storage space etc. 
Let us suppose that to any operation <p which the automaton has, in principle, 
at its disposal a cost c(q>) of the application of this operation is ascribed; for the sake 
of simplicity we suppose this cost to be the same in all the cases when cp applied. 
To any finite sequence <<jf>i, <?2> •••><?«> of operations we may ascribe the cost 
£ c((pi). Denote, now, for any (b,j, a, i, s> e EXP: 
1=1 
g(b,j, a, i, s, s0) = {s' e S: s' = s0(p1 <p2 . . . <p„ for some n and some 
q>u q>2, • • •, <P,„ V(b,j, s') holds} , 
i.e. g(b, j , a, i, s, s0) is the set of all situations accessible from the present (or initial) 
situation s0 by a finite operator sequence and enabling to verify or disprove V(a, i, s). 
The case g(b,j, a, i, s, s0) = 0 can be interpreted in such a way that, in the actual 
situation s0, no experiment exists which would give the possibility to verify V(a, i, s). 
The cost of transforming the initial situation s0 into an s' e g(b, j , a, i, s, s0) can 235 
be simply defined as Y, c(co^, where $' = s0 cpL cp2 • • • cpn and denoted by c(s'ls0), 
i = i 
define c(s'js0) as oo for any s' e S — g(b,j, a, i, s, s0). For any ib,}, a, i, s> e EXP 
we set 
C(b,j, a, i, s) = min {c(s'js0) : s' e g(b,j, a, i, s, s0)} , 
C(t>,;, a, i, s) = co , if g(b, j , a, i, s, s0) = 0 . 
The value C(b,j, a, i, s) has a simple interpretation: it is the minimal cost necessary 
to verify or disprove V(a, i, s) by realizing V(b,j, s') for an appropriate s'. Setting 
C(EXPv(a, i, s)) = min {C(b,j, a, i, s) : <fr,;> e EXPv(a, i, s)} , 
C(EXPK(a, i, s)) = oo , if EXPv(a, i, s) = 0 , 
we can easily see that the value C(EXPv(a, i, s)) expresses the minimal cost of an 
experiment enabling to verify or disprove V(a, i, s). Hence, we may immediately 
define 
Definition 1. Let T(a, <M, N), •) be a statistical deducibility testing procedure 
such that PE!(<M, N)) < e, s > 0 given a priori, let Ye if be a formula. Define 
C(Y e, co) = min {C(EXPv(a, i, s) (co)) : V(a, i, s, co) e T*(Y) (OJ)} , 
if T*(Y)(co)*0, 
C(Y e, co) = oo , if T*(Y) (co) = 0 . 
The value C(Y, e, co) will be called the cost of verifying or disproving of Y on the 
ground of an experiment sampled by the statistical deducibility testing procedure 
T(a(Y), <M,iV>,-). 
This definition closes the part of this paper devoted to developing a model of auto-
mated experiment planning based on an appropriate statistical deducibility testing 
procedure and it is why we feel the need to add two remarks concerning some open 
points in our notions introduced above. 
First, we have to mention the problem of reversibility of experiments. Among 
the demands which any experiment is usually supposed to satisfy is that of the 
possibility to return back to the situation before starting the experiment. This 
demand may involve many questions and problems going up to a rather high philo-
sophical level, but such considerations would be outside the subject of this paper. 
In our model this demand is not satisfiable because of our identifying "situations" 
with the sequences of actions having been applied since the initial situation till the 
present one, hence, the situation after the experiment can never be the same as 
before the experiment. To be able to cope with the demand of reversibility within 
our model we would need an equivalence relation on the set S of situations defining 
236 which two situations are considered to be "the same", however, to formalize it in 
an appropriate way is far from being so simple. 
Second, considering the value C(Y, B, CO) as the cost of verifying or disproving 
of Yon the ground of T(a(Y), <M, iV>, •) we must admit that it covers only partially 
the actual situation. The procedure T offers a set of hypotheses T*(Y) (co) the verifica-
tion any of them being, at once, also the verification of Y and to this set another set, 
namely 
(4) U {EXPv(a, i, s) (co) : V(a, i, s, co) e T*'(Y) (co)} 
of adequate experiments is ascribed. The positive answer to any of these experiments 
verifies also Yand the cost of the cheapest among them is just C(Y, e, co). This value 
does not express, however, the expenses connected with finding this cheapest experi-
ment among all the others contained in (4). The close and interesting connections 
between the properties of the statistical deducibility testing procedure T(a, <M, N}, •) 
and those of C(Y, e, co) justifies, nevertheless, the introduced definition of C(Y, e, co). 
The value C(Y, e, co) describes the expenses necessary in order to verify or disprove 
at least one among the formulas in T*(Y) (co). However, these two possible answers 
are of different value for the further use, namely, verifying at least one formula 
from T*(Y) (co) to be valid is sufficient for proclaiming Yto be valid as well without 
any doubts. On the other hand, even in case all the formulas from T*(Y) (co) are 
disproved on the ground of some experiments we cannot be sure whether Y holds 
or does not hold. It is why we define the notion of verifying conditions EXP+ a 
c EXP as the set of all quintuples (b,j, a, i, s} e EXP such that the formula 
V(a, i, s) is verified supposing V(b,j, s') to be valid in a situation s'. Using EXP+ 
instead of EXP we define EXP+(a, i, s) (experiment for verifying V(a, i, s)), 
g+(b, j , a, i, s, s0), C
+(b,j, a, i, s), C+(EXP+(a, i, s)) and, finally, C+(Y, e, co). 
Theorem 3. If Y is a non-valid formula, then C+(Y, e, co) = co for any e > 0, 
coeQ. 
Proof. If Yis not valid, then Ye i f - ST, hence, if V(a, i, s) -• Yis provable, 
then V(a, i, s) e i f — 3~, so T*(Y) c i f — &~. However, experiments are supposed 
to give correct answers, so no experiment exists verifying a non-valid formula. This 
gives, that V(a, i, s) e JSf - & implies EXP+(a, i, s) = 0, C+(EXP+(a, i, s)) = GO 
and, finally, C+(Y s, co) = co. Q.E.D. 
Set, for any Ye if, 
C0(Y) = min {C(EXPY(a, i, s)) : V(a, i, s) \-efY} , 
C+(Y) = min {C+(EXP+(a, i, s)) : V(a, i, s) VefY} , 
where the symbol \-ef means that the deduction in question is provable by the means 
being at the automaton disposal. 
Theorem 4. If Yis a valid formula such that Co (Y) < oo, then, for £ -> 0, 
P({co : C+(Y 8, co) = C0
+(Y)}) /> 1 . 
Proof. Y is valid and C0(Y) < °o, hence, there is at least one formula, 
say V(a0, i0, s0), such that V(a0, i0, s0) e ST, V(a0, i0, s0) YefY and 
C+(EXP+(a0, i0, s0)) = C+(Y). 
The statistical deducibility testing procedure T(a (Y), <M, N), •) is completely defined 
by the pair <M, iV>, hence, for a fixed N there is just N + 1 possible procedures 
with at most AT + 1 different values of P £ 1 « M , N)). To minimize PEt((M, N)) un-
der the minimal among these values requests, hence, to enlarge N, so £ -> 0 implies 
N —> co. However, 
P({w: a^co) = F(a0, ,0> «„)}) > 0 , 
so, according to the supposed statistical independence and equal distribution of at 
we have 
P({co : V(a0, i0, s0) e {a^u)), a2(co), ...', ocN(co)}}) = 
_ i _ (1 _ P({co : «.(„) _ K(C0 , .0, so)}))'' 
and this expression tends to 1 if At increases. Moreover, V(a0, i0, s0) e {<xY(co), ... 
...,aN(co)} implies V(a0, i0,s0)eT*(Y) as V(a0, i0,s0)\-efY, and this implies, 
again, that C + (Y e, co) = C0 (Y). Hence, if 8 -*• 0, then 
P({„: C + (Y £, co) = C0
+(Y)}) -> 1 , 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 5. Let a be a random variable defined on the probability space <£2, Sf, P) 
and taking its values in the set JS? of formulas, let K > 0 be a given real number. 
Then, for e -> 0, 
£(min {_:, C(a(-), e, •)}/{„: T(a(a>), <M, JV>, co) = t}) -> 
-> £(min {K, C0
h(a(•))}/{_: «(©) e ST}) 
(here £( ' /A) denotes the conditional expected value of the random variable in ques-
tion conditioned by the random event A). 
Proof. Because of the fact that 0 < min {K, C(a(co), e, co)} ^ K for any co e Q 
we have 
£(min {K, C(a(-), £, •)}/{«: T(a(w), <M, N), co) = t}) = 
= f(min {K, C(a(-). £, •)}) dP(-/{„: T(a(co), <M, iV>, co) = t}) = 
= I f(min {K, C(a(-), e, •)}) dP(-/{co: T(a(co), <M, N}, co) = t} n {co: a(co) e JT})1. 
. P({co: a(co) e ^}/{a>: T(a(co), <M, N>, co) = t}) + 
+ [ f(min {K, C(a(-), £, •)}) dP(-/{co: T(a(co), <M, A>, co) = t} n 
n {co: a(co) e JSP - JT})! P({co: a(co) e J§? - jT}/{c»: T(a(co), <M, iV>, co) = t}). 
According to the definition of the first type probability of error and according 
to the assumption that we take into consideration only such statistical deducibility 
testing procedures for which this probability is majorized by E, we obtain (using 
Bayes rule) 
P({co: a(co) e ££ - -T}\{co: T(a(co), <M, A7>, co) = t}) = 
= P E , « M , AT» P({co: a(co) e S£ - 3T}) (P({co: T(a(co), <M, At>, co) = t ) _ 1 ^ £Cl , 
where 
P({co: a(co) e Sf - 3T}) 
Cl ~ P({co: T(a(co), <M, JV>, co) = t}) 
is a constant value. This result and (5) give 
(6) 
T |(min {K, C(a(-), £, •)}) dP(-/{co: T(a(co), <M, N>, co) = t} n {co: a(co) € ,T})1 . 
. P({co: a(co) 6 .*"}/{©: T(a(co), <M, N>, co) = t}) ^ 
g E(min{K, C(a(-), £, •)}) ^ 
^ I [(rain {K, C(a(-), e, •)}) dP(-/{co: T(a(co), <M, N), co) = t} n {co: a(co) e ,T})\. 
. P({co: a(co) e *T}\{co: T(a(co), <M, JV>, co) = t}) + Kec, . 
Moreover, 
(7) 
I" f(min [K, C(a(-), £, •)}) dP(-/{co: T(a(co), <M, /V>, co) = t} n {co: a(co) e JT})1. 
. P({co : a(w) e jr}/{co : T(a(co), <M, JV>, co) = t}) £ 
2: f(min {K, C(a(-), e, •)}) dP(-/{co: a ( c o ) e ^ } ) l ( l - ec.) -
- [P({co: T(<x(co), <M, JV>, CO) = f} n {co: a(co) e .T})] K(l - EC,) = 
= f" f(min {K, C(x(co), e, •)}) dP(-/{o>: a(co) e ^ } ) 1 (1 - ec.) -
- F £ 1 « M , iV» P({w: a(cu) e 5"}) X(l - ec.) . 
If <x(co) e ST, then C(a(a>), e, co) = C+(a(co), e, co), hence (7) equals to 
[ j (min {K, C+(a(-), e, •)}) dP(-/{co: a(co) e ^ } ) J (1 - ec,) -
- P£X(<M, JV» P({CL>: a(co) e 3T}) K(\ - eCl) ^ 
^ T f(min {K, C+(a(-), e, •)}) dP(-/{a>. a(co) e .^})1 (1 - ec2) -
- X P({co: C+(a(a>), e, co) * C+(a(a>))}) - Xe(l - eCl) P({co: a(co) e .T}) ^ 
^ £((min {if, C+(a(-))})/{« : *(co) e 3T}) - K P({co : C+(a(«), e, co) * C+(a(co))}) -
- K e(l - eCl) P({co: a(a>) e iT}). 
Theorem 4 gives that, for e -» 0, 
P({cu: C+(a(w), e, w) * C0 (a(a>))}) -» 1 , 
so it follows immediately, that the right side of the last inequality in (8) tends to 
E((min{K,CZ(x(-))})l{co:z(co)e3r}), 
if e —> 0, Combining this result with (6) we obtain that, for e -> 0, 
£(min {K, C(a(-), e, •)}/{<»: T(a(co), <M, JV>, co) = t}) -* 
-* E(min {K, C+(a(-))}/{«: a(co) e <T}), 
Q.E.D. 
In spite of the fact that from the formal point of view the foregoing theorem seems 
to be rather complicated, its intuitive sense is simple. In a practical case of auto-
mated experiment planning and executing the automaton is not allowed to continue 
this activity without any a priori given bound concerning the maximal admissible 
cost of such an experiment. Our investigating the random variable 
min {K, C(a(-), e, •)} instead of C itself reflects this condition and from the purely 
mathematical point of view this boundedness enables to prove the assertion of Theo-
rem 5. Its sense is as follows: the expected value of expenses connected with verifying 
or disproving these formulas, which have been proclaimed to be theorems by the 
used statistical deducibility testing procedure tends to the expected value of the 
minimal expenses connected with verifying theorems, when the first type probability 
240 of error connected with the used testing procedure tends to 0. Hence, the smaller 
this probability of error is the better to orient oneself to verifying (and to neglect 
disproving) when the auxiliary hypotheses from T*(a(co)) are investigated in more 
details. 
In order to be able to prove some more assertions concerning the expenses connect-
ed with automatically proposed experiments let us introduce the notions if support 
and effective support of a formula. If Y is a formula from if, then its support is 
denoted by Sup(Y) and defined 
Sup(Y) = {V(a, i, s) : V(a, i, s)YY} a r . 
The effective support Sup0(Y) is defined 
Sup0(Y) = {V(a, i, s) : V(a, i, s) YefY} c r , 
where V(a, i, s) he /Ymeans that V(fl, i, s) hYand, at the same time, the automaton 
is able to prove Yfrom V(fl, i, s) using the theorem-prover being at its disposal. 
Lemma 1. Let Yt, Y2, . . . , Y„ be formulas from £f. Then 
a)Sup(VYj)=>\JSup(Yj). 
j-i j=t 
b) if Yef is closed with respect to propositional calculus tautologies (i.e. for any such 
tautology YSup0(Y) = r = {V(fl, i, s) : ael
2,ie Jf,se S}), then 
Sup0(\JYj)^ \jsup0(Yj). 
J = I J = I 
Proof, (a) follows immediately from the definition of Sup. 
(b) The formula 
(V(a, i, s) -+ Y.) -»(V(a, i, s) - V Yj) 
J = I 
is a propositional calculus tautology, hence, it is deducible in the sense of Yef, 
which gives also 
V(«, i, s) - Yi Yef V(a, i, s) -+ V Yj 
J = I 
and 
V(fl, i, s) Yef V Yj , 
j = i 
hence, Sup0( V Y;) -> U Sup0(Yj). Q.E.D. 
J = I j = i 
Clearly, for any Y, Sup0(Y) <= Sup(Y). If Y is a theorem, then 5wp(Y) = r (but 
Supo(^) * r , in general), if Y is a non-theorem, then Sup(Y) c.r - ST = r ^ 
n(£ - 9~). 
We have defined the cost of an experiment EXPv(a, i, s) only for elementary 241 
formulas V(a. i, 5). Let us extend this definition to the case of an alternative of such 
elementary formulas setting 
C(EXPV( V V(aj, ij, sj))) = min {C(EXPv(aj, ij, Sj)) : j ^ n} . 
j = i 
In order to abbreviate our further reasonings let us introduce the following notion. 
Definition 2. The cost C of experiments is called continuous with respect to Yef, 
if for any random variable a defined on the probability space <£2, y, P>, taking its 
values in "V and such that P({co : a(co) = V(a, ;', s)}) > 0 for any V(a, i, s)ei/~ and 
for any sequence {V(aJy ij, Sj)}f=\, 
lim P({co : a(co)eSuPo V( V (a,, .,, Sj))}) = 1 
« ^ O 0 j = l 
implies 
lim C(EXPV( V V(aj, ij, Sj))) = 0 . 
H-.00 jml 
Theorem 6. Let the cost C of experiments be continuous with respect to Yef. 
Suppose that there is, for any theorem Yand any V(a, i, s) e V, such a V(a', V', s') e 'f" 
that V(a', i', s') \-efY and V(a, i, s) e Sup0(V(a', i', s')). Then there is a real conti-
nuous function / : <0, 1> -» <0, 1> such that lim/(x) = 0 and, moreover, for any 
x-*0 
theorem Yand any to e Q, T(a(Y), e, to) = t implies C(Y e, co) < f(e). 
Proof. Let Ybe a theorem, let 
T(a(Y), e, co) = T(a(Y), <M(e), 7V(e)>, co) = t . 
This means that N(e) formulas V(au iu su co), V(a2, i2, s2, to), ..., V(aN, iN, sN, co) 
have been sampled, the relations V(a,-, iJt Sj) YefY, j ^ !^(
e)) have been tested and 
at least M(e) among them have been proved to hold. Take any V(a, i, s) e ir, denote 
by V(a', i', s') one among the formulas satisfying V(a, i, s) e Sup0(V(a', i', s')) and 
V(a', J", s')YefY, i.e. V(a', i', s')eSup0(Y). Denoting by a0 the random variable 
sampling V(a;, iJt sJt co), j ^ JV(e), we have that 
P({co : V(a, i, s) e SuPo( V V(aJk, iJk, sjk, to))}) > 
k=\ 
N(s) 
^ P({co : V(a', i', s') e U {V(«;, ij, Sj, to)}}) = 
j=i 
= 1 - (1 - P({co : a0(co) = V(a', i', s')}))
NM , 
242 where V(aJk, iJk, sJk, co), k = 1, 2, ..., m, M(e) <. m <. N(e), denotes those formulas 
among V(au iu su co), ..., V(aN, iN, sN, co), for which V(aJk, ijk, sjk, co) he /Yholds. 
Hence, 
P({co : u(co) e SuPo( V V(aJk, ijk, sjk, co))}) = 
k=\ 
= I K - - (1 - K{» • <u) = V(*'. <"> s'))Te)) P({« = « o H = V(a, i, s)}) = 
= £ ( 1 - ( 1 - ^ : ^ ( 0 , ) = ^ ' ^ ' , 5 ' ) } ) ) ^ ) , 
the sum is taken over all V(a, i, s) e "T. Now, if e -> 0, then N(e) -> oo (see the proof 
of Theorem 4) and this implies that also M(e) -> co and m -> oo (if N —> oo and M is 
bounded, then PEt((M, N)) -> 1 as can be easily seen and this contradicts the con-
dition PEy((M, N}) < e). This gives that 
P({co : a(co) e SuPo( V V(aJk, iJk, sJk, co))}) - 1 
k=l 
and, applying the continuity condition we have that 
lim C(EXPV( V V(aJk, ijk, sJk, co))) = 0 . 
m^oo j = l 
However, C(EXPV( V V(aJk, ijk, sJk, co))) = min {C(EXPr(aJk, iJk, sJk, coj) : k < m} = 
J' = I 
= min (C(EXPv(a, i, s)) (co) : V(a, i, s, co) e T*(Y) (co)} = C(Y e, co) according to 
Definition 1. Hence, for any 8 > 0 there is/(e) such t h a t / is a continuous function, 
lim/(x) = 0 and T(a(Y), e, co) = t implies C(Y e, co) < f(x). Q.E.D. 
Remark. The condition that there is, for any Ye ST and V(a, i, s)ef"~sucha V(a', i',s') 
that V(a, i, s) e Sup0(V(a', i', s')) and V(a , /', s') e Sup0(Y) can be called an inter-
mediate deducibility condition. It sounds, intuitively, that any formula can be useful 
in our attempt to prove a theorem under the condition that an appropriate inter-
mediate formula is chosen. Recall that, replacing he / by h, this condition becomes 
trivial, as V(a, i, s) e Sup(V(a', i', s')) and V(a', z", s) e Sup(Y) implies immediately 
that V(a, i, s) e Sup(Y). More sophisticated results could be obtained using a genera-
lized n-steps intermediate deducibility condition, but this problem will not be in-
vestigated here. 
The conditions of Theorem 6 require not only that Y were proclaimed to be a theo-
rem, but also that it were, indeed, a theorem. This assumption is not too natural, 
as the only we know (or the automaton knows) about the tested formula is the result 
of the statistical deducibility testing procedure. The next theorem shows that the 
assumption Ye $~ can be replaced by another one, namely by that of a restriction 
of the cost of unsuccessful experiments. Put, for a real K > 0, 
CK(EXPv(a, i, s)) = min {K, C(EXPv(a, i, s))} 
and define CK(EXPV( V V(ad, ip Sj))) and CA(Y e, co) as above, just using CK instead 
J = I 
of C (a similar idea as in Theorem 5). Clearly, CK(Y, e, co) ̂  K for any coeQ and 
e > 0. 
Theorem 7. Let a real K > 0 be given, let the cost C of experiments be continuous 
with respect to \-ef, let the intermediate deducibility condition hold, let a be a random 
variable defined on the probability space {Q, if, P) and taking its values in the set i f 
of all formulas. Then, for e -> 0, 
E(CK(Y, e, (o)j{(o : T(a(co), e, co) = t}) - 0 . 
Proof. Clearly, as the expected value is a linear functional, we have 
E(CK(Y, e, co)j{(o : T(a(co), e, co) = t}) = 
= E(CK(Y, e, co)l{(o : T(a(co), e, co) = t} n {co : a(co) e ST}) P({co : a(co) e P}) + 
+ E(CK(Y, e, co)/{co:T(a(co), e, co) = t} n {co:a(co)e i f - 3T}) P({co:a(co)E if - . ^} ) . 
The first component tends to 0 when e -> 0 because of Theorem 6 and the fact that 
CK is uniformly bounded by K. The other component can be majorized by the expres-
sion 
K P({co : T(a(co), e, co) = t} n {co : a(co) e if - ST}) ^ Ke 
according to the fact that the first order probability of error is supposed to be majori-
zed uniformly by e. Hence, both the components tend to 0 when e -> 0 and the 
theorem is proved. Q.E.D. 
A more detailed investigation of our statistically based mechanized experiment 
planning procedure seems to be justifiable specially in the case of some concrete 
automaton-environment system, as its features could justify some more conditions 
imposed to the cost C, testing procedure T etc. and these conditions would enable 
to prove some more detailed properties concerning the proposed experiment planning 
procedure. As the kind of such an investigation would differ significantly from the 
pure mathematical considerations presented in this paper we have decided to limit 
ourselves, in this paper, to the theoretical reasonings in the extent given above. 
(Received November 6, 1976.) 
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